

**TRIDENT RESISTER'S
HANDBOOK**

Bob Aldridge, Editor

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631 Kiely Boulevard
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THIS HANDBOOK IS DEDICATED
TO THE RELIEF OF ALL WHO SUFFER
BECAUSE WE SQUANDER OUR WEALTH, TALENT, AND RESOURCES
ON TRIDENT

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FOREWORD

This *Trident Resister's Handbook* describes in detail a system of present and future death. Trident's killing has already begun. Just as it can kill entire nations abroad in the future, Trident is now killing people in the two nations which are building and deploying it, the United States and Britain. Consider these four points:

1) In the 1992 US presidential campaign and the British election earlier that year, the major candidates ignored the connection between economic militarism and the deepening suffering of inner-city populations. The needs of city people for decent education, jobs, housing, etc. in the face of billions of dollars and pounds of continued nuclear weapons spending were bypassed in both British and US elections. Can we who live in these cities find another way to cast our ballots? Can we vote by nonviolent direct action?

2) The US and Britain are committed to completing *eight more* Trident submarines, five for the US and three for Britain. The US has already sent to sea 13 Trident submarines, carrying 2,496 nuclear warheads, with the combined explosive power of over 28,000 Hiroshima bombs (in addition to the other two legs of the strategic triad, with thousands of more nuclear warheads in underground missile silos and intercontinental bombers). Given the end of both the Soviet Union and the Cold War, why are our governments continuing to build *eight more* Trident submarines?

3) The missile propellants for the US and British Tridents continue to be shipped by rail, at the rate of one per week (and are scheduled to be so shipped for years to come), through some of the same city populations which suffer most from the economic underside of nuclear weapons wastefulness -- San Jose, Oakland, Sacramento, Reno, Ogden, Salt Lake City, Pueblo, Topeka, Lawrence, Kansas City, St. Louis, East St. Louis, Evansville, Nashville, Birmingham, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Jacksonville. The shipments endanger almost daily, by the threat of fire and explosion, the very people they are already destroying by upside-down budget priorities. Can we show by nonviolent action the intolerable connection represented by these trains?

4) One of America's best known educators, Father Theodore Hesburgh, former Notre Dame president, observed in a speech (to Business Executives for National Security at Stamford, Connecticut, 9 October 1991) that by the year 2000 one-third of US minority populations will be unemployable because of lack of education. He then said, "Give me the two-billion-dollar budget for **one Trident submarine** and I can turn around the education of minorities in the country." A British educator could have said, "Give me the 23 billion pounds that our government is prepared to spend over the next 20 years for four Trident submarines and I can turn around the education of our neediest citizens." Why can't this turn-around be done now in both the US and Britain?

TRIDENT RESISTER'S HANDBOOK

These pages tell us all we need to know for a responsible choice. Whereas Trident means death now and in the future, accepting responsibility to convert Trident to human resources would mean life for many. Will we choose life?

Jim Douglass
Birmingham, Alabama

PREFACE

Trident is the icon of our violent society. It epitomizes the destructiveness, the hatred, the greediness of our collective public attitude. The Trident submarine and missile system is the most devastating icon humankind has ever produced. It is proper that we focus on changing both our attitude and society's icon.

We must keep in mind that stopping Trident will not cure our society. The roots of Trident run much deeper than the weapon itself. Peace and justice will come only when we root out the violence in each of us. A paragraph from the old Pacific Life Community statement on nonviolence expresses this well:

... nonviolence is the force of truth sought ever more deeply in each of our lives, and expressed ever more directly in our relations with others. Nonviolence begins by facing the Trident in ourselves, whether that Trident be the death-dealing source of our own income, an affluent and exploitive way of life, our indifference to the struggles of suffering friends and global neighbors -- whatever form our particular ego-centered rejections of the human family may take. If we can begin to respond truthfully to our own Tridents, then we can also respond in truth to the world-destructive Trident... Nonviolence is a constant experiment in deepening in truth, and in testing the truth by betting our lives on it in the world.

Striving to abolish weapons is not good enough. When we adopt a more penetrating goal -- that is, transforming the source rather than smashing the image -- we are beginning to understand what Trident resistance is all about.

It is my hope that this handbook will help in achieving those goals. The loose-leaf arrangement is geared toward timely updating. By filling out the handbook registration card, you will receive periodic updated pages and directions for inserting them, and the bill will only be for printing, packaging and postage. You will not receive these updates unless you send in the registration card.

In this handbook I shall use the American spelling of words, simply because it is easier for me (and the spelling checker on my word processor). However, for proper names, titles, and quotations I have tried to adhere to the British spelling where applicable (defence v. defense, programme v. program, judgement v. judgment, scepticism v. skepticism, armour v. armor, etc.).

An index could serve some purpose but I feel it is not feasible to maintain during the constant updating that I expect this handbook to experience. In order to partially compensate, I have made the "Contents" as descriptive as possible.

TRIDENT RESISTER'S HANDBOOK

Most of the insight and ideas come from others who have written on the various subjects. Some authors have impressed me with their concepts and understanding, and I have paraphrased liberally from them after giving them credit as the source.

This handbook is not designed as a volume to read from cover to cover and then store on the shelf. Rather, it is intended to be a ready reference of information and knowledge that will promote informed dialogue and responsible resistance.

In order to make this handbook an evolving tool, I urge the readers to submit corrections, suggested additions, or any other ideas which might come to mind. Particularly, I encourage concrete suggestions for the nonviolent alternatives and the resources sections. It is my hope that this handbook will become a community project of the international Trident Resistance Network.

One other point. Throughout this handbook I refer to the weapons-reduction agreement which took place on 16 June 1992 as the "Bush-Yeltsin agreement." It has now been named "START-2." Corrections in this nomenclature will be made during revisions to this handbook.

I wish to thank all who have contributed and still contribute to the compilation of this handbook. The names are now too numerous to list, but this handbook would not be possible without help from many on both sides of the Atlantic. My special appreciation and thanks goes to Janet, whose encouragement and love has kept me going.

May peace be with you all.

Bob Aldridge
Santa Clara, California

FINANCING POLICY

I have chosen the *Trident Resister's Handbook* as my personal contribution to the Peace and Justice Movement. All labor is donated. Also, all reimbursements requested are for expenses only. But I have had to define a method of financing this project by which I only charge expenses and yet obtain enough donations to keep the project moving. That method for the US edition is as follows.

The original (first run) cost for the new *Trident Resister's Handbook* came from two sources:

1. \$333 -- half of my expense reimbursement from "Nuclear-Free Local Authorities" of Manchester, England for participating in an anti-Trident conference at Glasgow, Scotland in 1992. (The other half went toward publication of the British edition.)
2. \$350 -- a grant from the Agape Foundation in San Francisco, California.

These two figures add up to \$683, which I consider the revolving fund target level for the Trident Resister's Handbook project. If the revolving fund ever exceeds that amount (counting the value of handbooks in inventory, which seldom exceed ten) the excess will be deducted from cost of the next update. If the revolving fund drops below that amount, the deficit will be added to the cost of the next update.

Periodic updates affect the revolving fund in a negative manner. About half-a-dozen complimentary copies plus updating the handbooks in inventory contribute toward the total revision cost. This cost is amortized among the remaining handbook holders. But since there is not a 100-percent response to my "Request for Reimbursement," full costs have never been recovered. Some people do donate more than is requested and that helps to offset the deficit.

In order to keep interested people from paying an unfair amount, a new policy regarding reimbursement will commence in 1995. Any handbook holder who has failed to reimburse for the two previous revisions will be assumed to no longer have use for the *Trident Resister's Handbook* and will be removed from the distribution list. Hardship cases will be given consideration.

The sale of new *Trident Resister's Handbooks* helps the revolving fund in a positive way. The reimbursement requested for each handbook remains at the original \$15 plus postage. That may seem high since reprints, even though there are now more pages, are still cheaper than the original batch because certain "development" costs no longer appear. However, new handbooks are always completely updated with all revisions. Since reimbursements for new handbooks go into the revolving fund, any excess over actual reprinting expenses helps to defray the revolving fund deficit and thereby makes future revisions cheaper for everyone.

In summary, the total reimbursement requested for each revision will be the revolving fund target (\$683) less the actual revolving fund balance (after expenses for

TRIDENT RESISTER'S HANDBOOK

the revision). If the actual balance exceeds the target there will be no reimbursement requested. Postage will also fit into this formula. In this manner there will be no profit involved, and the distribution of expenses will be as fair as possible.

**Bob Aldridge
Santa Clara, California**