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SECTION 9
NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE
AND ALTERNATIVES TO
MILITARY FORCE
9.1 BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT: WHERE TO START?

In Trident Resister’s Handbook 1992 I wrote a chapter presenting my thoughts on how a better resistance movement could be organized. There has been some enthusiasm shown for my suggestions so I am repeating the salient points as something to start picking at. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind, I believe, that we have to become better in many ways before we achieve even our short-term goal of stopping the Trident weapons system, to say nothing of approaching our ultimate goal of universal peace and justice. So any further suggestions or improvements on these ideas are strongly encouraged. Let us use the insight of all to hammer out a fruitful plan for action and living.

A. FIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EFFICIENT NETWORK

Presidents have for decades tried futilely to make their office a monarchy. Their failure, symbolized by the outcome in Vietnam, has resulted in a modicum of control over our national leaders. Now, quickness and decisiveness have again freed these leaders from constitutional restraints.

We in the peace and justice movement must also adapt to new thinking. Rather than reacting to situations after they occur, we must have contingency plans in place, such as the Pledge of Resistance which in my opinion prevented the Invasion of Nicaragua. Instead of nostalgically clinging to yesterday’s philosophy, we need to experiment with fresh approaches to changing unjust situations. Toward meeting these goals I see five distinct needs -- unity, communication, systematic research, anticipatory planning, and self improvement.


As I lay on my bunk during a stay at Elmwood Detention Center, I watched the black youth across the aisle. He was a healthy-looking member of my children’s generation. His smile was disarming and his enjoyment of life obvious. Quite often I visualize one of my own children, or grandchildren, in the place of young people I meet. I find that it softens my attitude and helps me to be more understanding. This black youth haunted me. I could visualize him in the various stages of growing up that I saw my own children experience. He must be loved by someone, somewhere. What had caused him to be incarcerated?

I never found out the details but in today’s society it is not hard to guess. Perhaps it was car theft, or drugs, or many other actions that desperate people resort to in a society stacked against them. I was in jail for political protest. Possibly he was in there...
for the same reason but didn't recognize it as such. Perhaps if he and I better understood
the motivations behind our respective behavior we would find ourselves not too far apart.
Perhaps with better dialogue we could plan together for more effective actions.

This anecdote illustrates not only the lack of understanding, but also the lack of
unity in seeking a better way of life. It is a common lament that peace and justice organi-
izations seldom have minorities in their ranks. The main reason is that they have their
own critical issues to face. One person can't physically participate in every issue.
Neither is it possible to have intricate knowledge of every aspect of peace and justice
work, or even to read all the material that peace and justice organizations generate.

What I mean by unity is an understanding of, and solidarity with, other groups. The
"think globally and act locally" motto expresses the idea. We in the anti-Trident network
are doing what we are called upon to do, and that is good. But, as an extreme case, do
we fully understand the parallel effort of, say, street gangs in east San Jose, or Los
Angeles, or any other major city? Is it possible for people committed to nonviolence to
act in solidarity with such youth when neither we nor they can sort out the motivation
behind their violent tactics?

Those are potent thoughts to nibble on. Such unity may be the ultimate goal but a
better understanding of attitudes needs to be discovered, to say nothing of feeling the
power of nonviolence. In the meantime we can build unity among existing groups --
anti-militarism, environmental, racial-equality, sexual-equality, anti-poverty, mor-
ality/ethnic-building, indigenous self-determination, and many more. Understanding our
common goals and maintaining solidarity in the multiplicity of actions we undertake goes a
long way toward empowering all of us.

2. Systematic Research: Digging Out the Truth.

Some researchers work well together as a network -- each undertaking the area
of their expertise. Too many others are duplicating efforts and even competing for recog-
nition. I envision a more systematic research network where many areas are being
studied simultaneously with information flowing back and forth -- more areas in more de-
tail than are now being addressed by peace researchers. Much information from many
disciplines is needed. Many researchers would be eager to plug into a well-organized
network where they could see their efforts appreciated and better used.

This research network would also have to be flexible. One function would be to
address current situations as they unfold so that future events can be predicted. For in-
stance, had the peace and justice movement been more aware of the Pentagon's Air-Land
Battle plan of the early 1980s, we would have known better what to expect in the Persian
Gulf.

3. Communication: Key to Planning and Solidarity.

Communication falls into two general categories. One is to provide detailed infor-
mation on certain subjects for specific groups to use in planning their resistance activi-
ties. The second is to provide the big picture for all factions of the peace and justice

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movement as well as for public education.

Many publications are addressing the first. Once facts are uncovered by research or other means, they must get out to the action groups in order to serve their usefulness. The Trident Information Network Newsletter is a good effort, as are CND publications in Britain. Nukewatch in both countries is doing a magnificent job. So is the Information Update prepared by the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security, and Pacific Bulletin published by the Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Movement, and BASIC Reports compiled by the British American Security Information Council, and many more. There are numerous publications providing massive quantities of information to keep their constituency informed. There is too much for the average person to absorb.

What I believe is needed most in the so-called peace press is a publication which would provide a succinct overview of all the issues, and their progress, without deluging the reader with intricate details. It would have to be tightly written and unmercifully edited. This is the organ that would build solidarity among diverse groups and provide the most effective public education. This is the instrument which presents a communication challenge.

4. **Anticipatory Planning: Contingencies for All Seasons.**

Media columnist Charles Krauthammer outlined three means of military intervention: the "gradualism" of Vietnam, the "passivity" of Beirut, and the "quick and decisive force" of the Gulf war. Military planners have found that the first two just don't move fast enough to be effective. The same is true of peace and justice activities for two reasons: (a) we want to be effective and (b) we have to stay ahead of the opponent.

With forethought and ingenuity we can have a structure in place before a military intervention or other undesirable activity takes place. We of the peace and justice movement were not ready when Desert Shield and Desert Storm broke out. We were thrown off balance by the rapidity of events. We weren't even mobilized before it was all over. No more shall we have the leisure of gradual public education to stop an aggression. Such education must take place before aggression starts. In short, we must call the shots before the military so as to negate its plans.

No, we were not ready for the Gulf war. We have been passive regarding events following the breakup of Yugoslavia. That is still a dangerous area for the wrong kind of involvement. At the time of this writing, US Marines are preparing to enter Somalia to guard relief supplies. How will the military use this opportunity to flex its muscles? Where is the peace and justice movement?

I hesitate to use the words "think tank," but that seems to be the answer here. It is not a new concept for the peace and justice movement. What I visualize are peace strategists who fit together all the researched data and political events to anticipate how
the movement will be most effective. This planning would also lay out the parameters for nonviolent, immediate-action plans to meet any potential crises -- so the groundwork can be in place.

Perhaps there should be a layer of these strategizing units. There could be mini-think tanks to advise each specific aspect of resistance, others to formulate plans to meet national emergencies, and still others to conceptualize ideas for inter-group cooperation. The possibilities and advantages seem to be endless.

5. Self Improvement: The Deciding Factor.

Self improvement probably should have been number one because all the above aspects of an effective peace and justice movement hinge on it. We need to overcome our feeling of parochialism toward the particular group we are in, the area of research we pursue, or the publication we help edit -- in short toward all of our personal activities in the Movement. Each person may have had specific feelings while reading the four aspects proposed above. If there was a feeling of enthusiasm and eagerness to participate, that is good. If there was a sensation of your activity or group being diluted, that deserves further examination. The feeling could be a good indication if it leads to a fallacy in what is proposed. But it might be an obstacle if one's status or reputation is perceived to be at stake.

By self-improvement under this aspect I mean, in general, striving to abolish all the attitudes which stand in the way of peace and justice for everyone. I also mean, in particular, all the attitudes which stand in the way of an effective peace and justice movement. In the final sense, they are the same.

6. THE CHALLENGE: ARE WE HUMAN ENOUGH?

Trident's real purpose is to protect the first-world lifestyle as that lifestyle exists today. To live so lavishly we buy products produced by corporate entrepreneurship in poorer countries. We then resist any action which threatens our way of living -- and so long as we wear moral blinders we will continue to do so.

We can't drift along blissfully indifferent forever. Catastrophe must be averted and stopping Trident is a good first step. Taking that step hinges on our motivation and courage. Stopping Trident challenges us to transcend material affluence and relate more closely to persecuted people. Stopping Trident will happen when new values guide us and then just as liberation came about in Zambia, Poland, the Philippines, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere -- western nations will again blossom into true democracies worthy of our pride. Folding our nuclear umbrella will mean living simpler so we can eliminate the deprivation of others, and cease being a market for the profiteers who use that umbrella to devastate poor countries. It will mean recognizing legislative stonewalling, government bellicosity, military propaganda -- and most of all recognizing the manner in which we delude ourselves to justify the status quo. Finally, it will mean standing up to the backlash which will occur when our efforts finally become effective. The question is, are we up to the challenge?

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9.2 WHY WE DON'T NEED TRIDENT

This chapter is a hodge podge of information on why we don't need and shouldn't have Trident. Sometimes it is instructive to compile, pro and con, all the arguments which may be used or encountered in a responsible resistance campaign. Such a list allows us to refresh our memory and organize our thoughts. This chapter will be a start toward that compilation. It will be expanded and altered as new information is supplied.

A. TRIDENT CAN NOT BE JUSTIFIED

Trident was designed, from a military viewpoint, to be a powerful, precise, and elusive weapon that would enhance America's dubious prestige as the invincible nuclear power. While advertised as the most stabilizing leg of the strategic nuclear triad because it is mobile at sea and not vulnerable to a first strike, critics have recognized since the early 1970s that it would be the ultimate first-strike weapon. That makes it the most destabilizing strategic weapon because it might motivate an opponent to strike first if America's intentions were misinterpreted during a serious international crisis.

Any perceived military justification for Trident should have disappeared with the Cold War. That did not happen. Information is being twisted to convince the public that Trident is still needed. Trident is not only becoming a strategic monad as the role of ICBMs and bombers fade, it is also entering the picture as a rapid-response weapon in a nuclear expeditionary force.

1. Trident as a Destabilizing First-Strike Weapon.

The overworked delusion that Trident stabilizes the nuclear standoff should have been thrown out with the Cold War. Yet we still hear about Trident submarines at sea being undetectable, which means they cannot be destroyed. That invulnerability is interpreted as stability because it discourages any would-be opponent from attempting a first strike against the US.

Today, Russia is the only country with weapons capable of attacking the US. But it no longer has the C^3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) infrastructure to carry out a coordinated operation. Russia may feel more vulnerable because of that. As they face US bombers and ICBMs, all the cards are on the table, so to speak. An opponent would have a sense of security in being able to watch them. If the US did strike, Moscow would have at least 30 minutes to fire back before their missiles are destroyed. Thus the Russians would feel they still had a deterrent.

Trident is another case. It can sneak around the ocean and attack quicker from all directions. During a crisis situation, if Moscow is really nervous, a misinterpreted false alarm could cause Russian missile commanders to retaliate immediately, thinking that if they hesitate they will never be able to do so. In any hypothetical scenario, Trident is a
dangerous and destabilizing weapon.

2. **Trident as a Nuclear Expeditionary Force.**

The Reed Panel recommended in 1991 that America should create a nuclear expeditionary force which would include a few strategic air-launched and submarine-launched weapons, as well as tactical nuclear systems (see chapter 1.2). This force would be for use against China and Third World countries.

Trident could be launched against any target. But you don't need a pile driver to pound a carpet tack. Using Trident in this role is contrary to the trend in weaponry. Smart and precise conventional weapons are replacing nuclear across the board. Over a decade ago, nuclear torpedoes, and depth bombs were succeeded by Mark-46 and Mark-48 torpedoes. Nuclear anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons have long ago given way to smart rockets. Battlefield nuclear weapons have recently been replaced with the Tactical Missile System and the Multiple-Launch Rocket System. Even the Spartan and Sprint anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) have succumbed to hit-to-kill weapons -- Star Wars is non-nuclear.

B. **TRIDENT AND THE BUSH-YELTSIN AGREEMENT**

President Bush, in exchange for other concessions, committed the United States to reduce its submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads by one-half. But the agreement specifies a deadline of 2003 to be implemented. It appears that the Pentagon and its contractors, backed by the White House, plan to continue deployment of the US Trident fleet and then cut back after all profits have been reaped. US officials say they have not yet decided whether they will reduce warheads by removing half the missiles from the full compliment of 18 submarines, or by removing half the warheads from the full compliment of 432 missiles. What has been decided is that the planned fleet of 18 submarines will not be reduced. There are alternatives beyond these either/or plans.

1. **Cancel the Contracts for the Last Four Submarines.**

Thirteen Ohio-class Trident submarines have been commissioned and the fourteenth has been launched. Four more are in various stages of construction but not beyond the point of no return. If the contracts were cancelled there would be certain cancellation fees obligated, but the savings would go a long way toward alleviating the national deficit and rectifying America's social injustices. Much of the money saved could be used to help displaced workers find socially-useful employment.
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2. Do Not Provide Funding for More Missiles.

Since enough missiles have already been ordered to carry the 1,728 warheads allowed under the Bush-Yeltsin agreement, there is no need to buy any more. Again, there may be some cancellation costs but, far from what the arms producers would have us believe, those costs would be a small fraction of the savings. It is the policy in business that when an investment no longer serves its purpose that it be scrapped, and what savings possible salvaged. A corporate board does not keep a program going just because a huge sum has already been invested. It is not too much to ask that governments behave as fiscally responsible with our tax dollars as private corporations do with their stockholders' money.

During the 1992 session of the US legislature, Senator Dale Bumpers introduced a bill to stop Trident-2 missile production now that the Cold War is over and warheads are going to be halved. His bill did not pass but it opened the door to a heated debate on Trident in 1993. Pressure needs to be applied to make certain that the missiles are cut at that time -- along with the last four submarines.

Jobs for the 3,500 people working on Trident-2 will become a big argument for continuing the program. Those workers can be helped with many billions of dollars to spare. Jobs must not be accepted as an alibi for continuing with Trident. The unspoken obstacle to stopping missile production is the $1 billion a year profit for Lockheed.

3. Billions will be Saved by Halting Trident Now.

As shown in Chapter 6.3, stopping all Trident missile and submarine construction at the end of FY 1993, and retiring older ships to bring the fleet down to nine submarines, will save $33.6 billion over the life of the Trident fleet. It will save $13.3 billion by the end of the century, and $2.4 billion in FY 1994 alone.
C. ARGUMENTS FOR STOPPING THE BRITISH TRIDENT

America is not the only nation deluding its people about Trident. Britain has pro-
mulgated incredible reasons for its Trident fleet. They hinge around such catchy words
as "national security," "minimum deterrence," and "independent deterrent." For every
proffered reason there is a deflating counter argument.

1. An Expensive Status Symbol.

The announced reason for Britain's four-submarine Trident fleet is to maintain
national security. But the term national security seems to be misconstrued as national
prestige -- seeking some perceived status attached to membership in the nuclear club.
Once in, being high in the pecking order provides certain delusions of advantage in inter-
national relations.

Trident assures the United States of remaining top dog in world affairs. But Britain
is a runner-up in the nuclear pecking order. It's chief rival is France, which is turning out
its own updated sea-based missile. Although the French M-4 SLBM does not match the
Trident-2 in range or accuracy, it is much superior to the old Polaris missiles in Britain's
remaining three Polaris submarines. Britain has to modernize or step off the ladder.

Field-Marshal Lord Carver, former Chief of Britain's Defence Staff, affirms that the
British government is defending a position it has never been willing to publicly admit: "It is
that, now we have established ourselves as a nuclear weapons power, we are not going
to abandon the world power status we think that gives us, certainly not as long as France
insists on retaining that position. It has never had, and certainly has not now, much to do
with an effective defence policy." [The Guardian, 10 Feb 92]

2. The Dependency of an Independent Deterrent.

Britain could never acquire its Trident fleet without the aid of the United States.
First of all, the submarines' missile sections and fire control rooms were designed in the
US. Westinghouse in Sunnyvale, California furnished all 16 missile launch tubes for the
first British boat.

The missiles are entirely furnished by the US on a lease basis. They will be
returned to US Sub Base Kings Bay every seven years, at least, for exchange. British
submarine crewmen will also be trained at Kings Bay.

Finally, the MIRVed reentry vehicle shell is purchased from the US. Even if Britain
designed and developed its own, as in the case of Chevaline, it would have to be flight
tested on a US missile range.

The bomb in the MIRV is ostensibly British. But it is, obviously, based on US design
and tested at America's Nevada Test Site. All in all, the British label on the bomb is more
a legal technicality than reality, because that bomb is undoubtedly a US clone.

After the submarine is operational it will still rely on the US for fulfilling its func-
tion. Since the extreme-low frequency (ELF) transmitter site once planned for Scotland
has never been constructed, British Trident submarines will depend on the US ELF trans-
mutter to call them up from the depths.

Once on the surface, or at launch depth, the submarine will have to accurately position itself by means of US NAVSTAR satellites. This is necessary or Trident missiles will have no more precision than Polaris. British missile-launching submarines also use the US Eastern Test Range in the Atlantic for practice firings, qualification tests, and crew training exercises.

Even after all that, Britain must still depend on US intelligence-gathering networks to define the targets, provide the launch trajectories, and determine when the missiles should be launched.

Will Trident be Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, even if there were something to deter? Hardly. Britain’s Trident system has “Made in USA” stamped all over it. Britain cannot be number two, or even number three. British Tridents are nothing more than an extension of America’s nuclear might.

Helping Britain to deploy Trident is nothing but the age-old game of arms trafficking, only at the nuclear level. Washington is doing nothing less than selling a nuclear missile system to another country. Such an act mocks the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and presents serious obstacles to the quest for a more peaceful world.

3. Minimum Deterrence of What?

The MOD has “always made it clear that the United Kingdom would deploy only the minimum deterrent required for our security needs.” [Statement On The Defense Estimates 1992, chapt. 1] But who will be deterred is not clear. It is even more fuzzy what constitutes a “minimum” deterrent. But throughout the 1980s it has been Britain’s position that the Trident represents minimum deterrence and is therefore not subject to arms control negotiations. But after the seven to eleven years assigned to implement the START Treaty and the Bush-Yeltsin agreement, and if missile defense capabilities do not significantly advance, MOD officials say “we will consider what further contribution we might make to arms control in the changed circumstances.” [Statement On The Defense Estimates 1992, chapt. 1] Further contribution?

So it would appear that citizens should be content with that vague definition and nebulous promise. That must not be the case. According to the House of Commons Defence Committee, “the justification for Trident, the number of warheads to be deployed and the scale of the strategic deterrent to that deployed by any potential enemy are once again legitimate political and military issues ...” [HC-337, p. vi] It would be healthy to a freely-elected government that the details of those issues be publicly aired and debated.
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4. The Fourth Sub is Superfluous.

From a critical viewpoint, all Trident submarines are superfluous. But even in government circles, the need for a fourth sub is debatable.

The MOD claims that four Trident subs are required to maintain one on-station at all times because of the margin for accidents (a discomforting thought). [The Guardian, 15 Jan 92] But let us look at the schedule. With only two submarines, and assuming British cycles to be the same as US, the 70-day patrol period and 30-day turn around allows one of them to be on-station at all times, and both on-station 40 percent of the time. Adding a third boat would allow one to be in overhaul, one in turn around, and at least one always on-station.

With one-year-duration overhauls scheduled at seven year intervals, a submarine would only be in overhaul for three years out of seven. During the other four years there would be at least two subs on station at all times. Only by grasping extreme possibilities, whatever they may be, can a fourth submarine be needed. And if worst-case possibilities are possible, even one submarine is too many to have anywhere.

This juggling of numbers becomes even more ridiculous when one realizes that Trident submarines are on-station even while in port. With the long-range Trident missiles the submarine does not have to travel great distances to reach its targets. Neither does the sub have to be submerged at sea to launch its missiles.

An interesting discussion took place in Parliament on 5 March 1992 regarding submarine readiness. [See HC-337, pp. 6-7] It was pointed out to Rear Admiral Ian Pirnie that the French have five ballistic-missile submarines with four always deployed (the fifth being in overhaul). Of those four deployed, three were always kept on station. The admiral was asked how the French can do that while the British need three submarines (sometimes only two deployed) to keep one at sea all the time? Admiral Pirnie refused to speculate on how the French operate their force or the definitions they were using. Neither did he explain how the British would operate or the definitions they use. It is safer to remain silent when something can’t be explained.

5. Trident Makes Britain More Aggressive.

Deploying the new submarine and missile system shows impudent disregard of the NPT by giving Britain a more offensive military posture. This new nuclear stance is manifested in four ways.

a. Offensive Escalation in Numbers Of Targets. With official assurance that each Vanguard-class submarine will carry no more than 128 warheads, at least initially, it seems appropriate to assign an average of eight to each of its 16 Trident-2 missiles. How does that sum up? If we examine the Polaris submarine force, we can calculate that the four boats, carrying sixteen missiles each, will have a total of 64 Polaris missiles. Since each missile can attack only one target, the Polaris fleet can attack 64 cities, assuming all the subs are available at one time, which they are not. That is a terrible toll but it gets worse with Trident.
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With each of the new Trident missiles carrying eight independently-targetable warheads, the number of targets which can be attacked rises to 512 -- an eight-fold increase over Polaris.

b. Offensive Escalation in Types of Targets. Even though the Chevaline warhead carried on British Polaris missiles is a MARV, it is not a precision MARV. It can only perform a pre-programmed roll intended to evade interceptor missiles. That maneuver makes Chevaline less accurate. So Polaris missiles can only threaten large and sprawling targets such as cities.

Trident-2’s 100-kiloton warheads, on the other hand, with their 400-500 foot maximum miss distance, approach a first-strike capability. If the missile has in-flight guidance updates from NAVSTAR satellites, it will be able to destroy the hardest of targets. While Polaris is only good as a city blaster, Trident-2 can land precisely within destruction distance of its aim point.

c. Offensive Escalation in Range to Targets. Range also fits into the picture. Polaris missiles, with a reach of 2500 nautical miles, can reach all of the former Soviet Union lying west of the Ural Mountains. They threaten Moscow, Kiev, and St. Petersburg while close to home base, but they can barely reach the Mid East.

Trident-2, on the other hand can reach out some 4,230 nautical miles with a full load. That covers the entire Mid East as well as large portions of China, India, and Northern Africa. But eight 100-kiloton warheads is by no means a full load, and so the range will be significantly greater -- possibly more like 6,000 nautical miles. Those warheads could reach such countries as South Africa, eastern China, and much of South America -- they could essentially cover half the earth's surface from their launch point.

d. Offensive Escalation in Quality. Another aspect of proliferation is the type of warhead planned for Trident. While the US and the former Soviet nuclear states plan to dramatically cut their inventory of MIRVed warheads, Britain is for the first time deploying MIRVs. MIRVs complicate treaty verification -- that is why SALT-1 and SALT-2 only limited nuclear delivery vehicles, not the warheads. MIRVs quickly multiply the number of nuclear bombs while maintaining the same number of carrier vehicles — switching from Polaris to Trident is a striking example. Deploying MIRVs is counter to the global trend and a blatant affront to sincere arms-reduction efforts.
Clearly -- by increasing the number of targets, changing the types of targets, threatening more countries at greater range, and introducing MIRVs -- the British Trident fleet is going to be grossly more destabilizing and volatile than Polaris. Trident will be a major step in aggression and proliferation.

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9.3 ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY FORCE

This chapter is a challenge. Given below is a scant outline of the problems facing a policy of nonviolence. As we put our heads together and pool ideas, this chapter will grow to become a dynamic tool for applying nonviolence to international relations. Specific issues will be addressed in an attempt to find acceptable nonviolent solutions.

A. HOW ABOUT THE SANCTIONS?

Sanctions are stronger, longer-lasting, and more humane than military solutions, although maybe not as immediate. The term "sanctions," however, encompasses many things. There should be discrimination regarding types of sanctions because some can be more devastating than war itself.

Military sanctions are usually the first imposed -- to cut off the flow of munitions and supplies that support the target country's military capability. Materials and technology for building weapons of mass destruction should always be denied.

Diplomatic sanctions are also pretty straightforward. The target country is essentially ostracized from the international community. Serbia and Montenegro were rightfully denied recognition as the successor to Yugoslavia, thus denying them the Yugoslav seat in the UN. They were also rightfully suspended from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Croatia should also be suspended from both the UN and CSCE as long as it occupies territory in Bosnia. Such isolation is often sufficient to bring an oppressive government to its senses. But usually diplomatic sanctions are backed by economic penalties.

Economic sanctions cannot be described so simply. They can range from token measures to such extremes that human rights are violated. People of the target country should never be deprived the necessities of life. A case in point is present-day Iraq. Economic sanctions, applied across the board, are depriving the Iraqi people of adequate food and medical care. Their social infrastructure has been devastated and the boycott of Iraqi oil blocks the only source of income to rebuild that infrastructure. Some peace and justice groups now advocate lifting certain aspects of the sanctions against Iraq.

On the other hand, conveniences should be cut off, and that could effectively persuade the people to change their government. But that persuasion should be so structured that the people recognize why sanctions are necessary and where the blame belongs. It is also important that sanctions do not incite additional violence.
Economic sanctions which hurt the industry needed to support an oppressive government, but do not deprive people of necessities, are the most effective. When big business found that the Vietnam conflict was hurting profits, it didn't take long for the US to cease its involvement. It is usually the profit-making aspect of economics which start wars, and hurting that aspect can quickly resolve hostilities.

For acceptable economic sanctions to work, they must be absolute, consistent and enforced. Absolute in the sense that everything except basic human needs are cut off. Consistent to the point of effectively monitoring everything going into the target country. Enforced by penalizing those countries which fail to cooperate -- such as Jordan during the Persian Gulf war -- with secondary sanctions. Above all, sanctions must be given time to be effective. The more they are absolute, consistent and enforced, the quicker they will become effective.

1. Former Yugoslavia as an Example.

When the European Community (EC) imposed an embargo against Serbia and Montenegro during the invasion of Croatia, those sanctions did perturb an already reeling economy and spark some anti-war protest. But those sanctions were effective only to the extent EC members complied. The US added the first of its diplomatic sanctions on 22 May 1992, and a full diplomatic break on June 23rd. These also had some effect. The Serbian Orthodox Church -- often known to be more Serbian than Orthodox -- denounced its own government, and the bishops' conference indirectly called on President Slobodan Milosevic to step down.

But it was not until the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory embargo of all but food and medicine that sanctions were absolute. In Belgrade, Yugoslavia's capital, tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrators -- described as the largest protest since March 1990 when Yugoslav army tanks were brought in to patrol Belgrade streets -- were calling for the Serbian president to step down.

By late June 1992 in Belgrade, UN-imposed sanctions were biting deeply. The economy was shattered and internal politics became increasingly stormy. Inflation climbed more than ten percent a day -- a 5,000 dinar note worth $550 three weeks before had dropped to $2.70. Textile industries shut down and virtually all construction was suspended. Tens of thousands of people had been laid off. Pensioners were especially devastated. Students occupied the university daily demanding that President Milosevic step down. The Serbian Orthodox Church continued to demand his resignation. Political opponents and ex-rulers in exile were becoming stronger.

2. Why Haven't Sanctions Stopped the Fighting?

We don't really know how consistent UN sanctions are being observed because the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO ships in the Adriatic Sea did not until recently have authority to turn away vessels suspected of violating the embargo. But if a given vessel refuses to be inspected, the country whose flag it flies should immediately be the target of sanctions strong enough to enforce cooperation. The continuing "ethnic cleans-
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ing” in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that some nations are not cooperating with the sanctions.

When the UN and its member nations really become sincere about forcefully imposing proper sanctions, it will in the long run prevent more death and suffering than military solutions. While eschewing sanctions which violate human rights, other embargoes should be applied immediately, and applied hard.

B. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

Another approach which should be cautiously considered for stopping an international injustice is the use of non-lethal force. Just as we sometimes have to restrain one of our children to prevent harm, it seems reasonable to use nonviolent force to prevent great tragedies. Nonviolent force shouldn’t have to be confined to purely non-cooperation, which is the basic theory behind sanctions. Nevertheless, non-lethal force could be a controversial area and should be approached with caution.

Existing non-lethal weapons are reportedly designed to eliminate casualties and long-term industrial damage. According to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, the Pentagon has “extensive capabilities that ... ought to be looked at carefully.” [AW&ST, 17 August 1992, P. 62]


Although non-lethal weapons are hidden in the depths of military secrecy, it is known that some were used during the Persian Gulf war. Tomahawk cruise missiles carried warheads loaded with thousands of spools of carbon-fiber string. When released in the air they would unravel like a roll of toilet paper dropped from an airplane. When those fibers fell across the outdoor transmission grid networks of powerplants, the resultant shorting caused wide-spread electrical disruption. According to Warren Piper, a retired senior official of Boston’s Stone & Webster Engineering Company who helped assess the war damage in Iraq, “close to all” the electrical networks of Serbia could be shut down for at least a few days with similar carbon-fiber attacks. [AW&ST, 17 August 1992, P. 62]

Since Serbia is highly dependent on electricity, such a shutdown would affect oil and gas pumping, food processing and storage, water and sewage disposal, and transportation. Repeated attacks could burn out transformers and other electrical equipment.

2. Electro-Magnetic Pulse Generator.

There has also been mention of an EMP-generator warhead carried on cruise missiles. The generated electro-magnetic pulse damages local electrical equipment with a power surge. An EMP generator may be a euphemism for a large explosive warhead. If so, it would probably not be desirable.

3. Chemical Compounds and Microbes.

Other non-lethal weapons are chemical compounds which destroy an aircraft’s
tires when sprayed on runways, and microbes which can turn large storage tanks of jet fuel into useless jelly. If these are harmless to humans they may be acceptable. But if they reach the threshold of chemical and biological weapons, they must be carefully scrutinized.

4. **Electronic Warfare.**

Non-lethal electronic warfare has been in use for many years -- jamming the target country's television/radio reception or broadcasting information to counter their own government's propaganda. Even the old World War II tactic of dropping leaflets would have a place in certain instances.

Perhaps we should stop using such terms as military force and sanctions. Perhaps the distinction should be between lethal and non-lethal means of persuasion. But whatever it is called, when our intellectual resources are turned toward developing non-lethal innovations rather than smarter weapons, all sorts of techniques will become available.

**C  CAN MILITARY FORCE EVER BE JUSTIFIED?**

Saying that military force may be justified under certain conditions comes dangerously close to endorsing the just-war theory. Nevertheless, situations in today's world seem not to lend themselves to either/or solutions. There are many shades of gray which must be recognized and dealt with. In our society, where street gangs and dope rings run rampant, would we be willing to lay off the police force?

At the time of this writing, US Marines are preparing to open relief routes in Somalia. There is bound to be bloodshed. But if those troops stick to the stated purpose of their intervention, is this incursion morally right? Will the lives saved outweigh the lives lost? (The old proportionality justification.) Or, is it a case where lives of guilty looters would be sacrificed rather than innocent men, women and children starving to death?

The UN has now approved the use of force in monitoring the blockade of former Yugoslavia. How far is military action morally justified? A warning shot across the bow may be harmless but what if the blockade-running ship fails to stop? Perhaps it would be acceptable to shoot off its rudder. Can or should the use of force go beyond that? What if the ship shoots back? What if it is escorted by fighting ships?

There are a lot of sticky questions popping up in current events. They are a headache for the moralist and a nightmare for the advocate of nonviolence. How shall those questions be answered?

[Editor's note: I have not included the above material to express my thinking. I do not know where I stand on these issues. They are included here to stimulate thought and promote an exchange of ideas so we can arrive at reasonable alternatives to violence.]

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